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CURRENT LEGISLATION
The issue was squarely presented to the court in Matter of Talbot
v. Board of Education of City of New York."' In that case the court
held that, where seven members comprised the Board of Education,
and of the seven only four were present at a meeting, one of the
four not voting, the striking out of certain specific items from the
budget on the votes of the remaining three present was invalid as
contravening Section 41 of the General Construction Law. Greene
v. Goodwin Sand & Gravel Co. 2 is also a case in point. There the
defendant, a gravel company, applied to the Highway Commissioners
for discontinuance of 2,000 feet of a highway. By a majority vote
the commissioners declared the highway abandoned. Application was
then made to the Town Board, whose consent was necessary to au-
thorize the action. This board consisted of six members, two of
whom declined to participate while a third was away. Only three
were qualified to vote, one less than a majority. The court held that,
inasmuch as the required number of persons necessary to make a
quorum had not participated at the meeting, the consent was ineffec-
tual for binding action. This phrase has also been removed from
the new statute as the new definition is complete without it.
While it is true that courts have almost uniformly handed down
decisions which were apparently consistent with the legislative intent,
as indicated by the cases cited, so that the present amendment is gen-
erally a codification of the previous interpretation of the statute, the
fact remained that the statute itself should be easily susceptible of
but one interpretation both by lawyers and by those public officials
who are wanting in legal training and who are often called upon to
construe this section. It is submitted that the new Section 41 attains
this objective. The words "quorum" and "majority" are simply de-
fined and easily understood. It would seem that the amended sec-
tion has effectively dissipated the clouds of uncertainty and ambiguity
which formerly enveloped the statute and has removed the last
vestiges of doubt as to legislative intent occasioned by the loose and
cumbersome phraseology of the old statute, thus reducing the neces-
sity for much future litigation.
IsADOR LIDDIE.
AMENDMENT TO DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW RELATIVE TO DIS-
SOLUTION OF MARRIAGE FOR INCURABLE INSANITY.-At common law
a marriage with a lunatic was void, not merely voidable.' The ra-
tionale of this rule was that an insane person was not capable of
11 171 Misc. 974, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 340 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
1272 Misc. 192, 129 N. Y. Supp. 709 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
11 BL. Coi. 438; Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343 (N. Y.
1820); Winslow v. Troy. 97 Me. 130, 53 At. 1008 (1902); Floyd County v.
Wolfe, 138 Iowa 749, 117 N. W. 32 (1908).
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understanding the meaning and nature of the marriage contract and
was therefore incapable of entering into such a contract. Further-
more, since the marriage was deemed void, it was not necessary to
establish the nullity by a court decree, although the Chancellor could
grant such decree for the "peace and conscience" of the parties.2
Because the basis of such an action was the mere judicial declaration
of nullity, such action could be brought by either the sane or insane
spouse.3 In New York, however, by statute, a marriage with an
insane person has been made voidable, and not absolutely void.4
Section 1137 of the Civil Practice Act has set forth the requirements
necessary to the bringing of an action for annulment on the ground
of insanity, the section prior to amendment specifying that such ac-
tion might be maintained by the lunatic or a relative who had an
interest to avoid the marriage.5 Under this section the question
often arose whether the privilege of avoidance was reciprocal. Sev-
eral lower court cases held that since at common law in New York,
independent of statute, equity had power to declare such marriage
void at the request of the sane spouse, the right should be read into
the statute.6  Other cases denied this right.7  The question was
finally settled in the Court of Appeals in the case of Hoadley v.
Hoadley 8 wherein it was determined that the sane spouse could not
bring such an action. The court stated that the statutory right to
avoid the marriage existed for the protection of the disabled party,
and that the legislature had set forth a statutory list of those who
may sue in such case, the sane spouse not being included. In that
case the plaintiff claimed that this interpretation would result in hard-
ship to a sane party who did not know of the insanity of his spouse
at the time of marriage. Judge Cardozo, in his opinion, answered
this contention as follows: "Much is said about hardship. Not all
of it is of such a nature as to be heeded by the law. The theory of
annulment on the ground of insanity is not that the sane spouse has
made a bad bargain in getting an insane partner. The theory is that
the insane partner to the union has manifested a consent that is un-
real for lack of a contracting mind. The hardship might be as great
in many of its phases if insanity supervened a month after marriage
or a year. It might be as great if the diseased condition were one
of body, and not of mind. The law turns a deaf ear to these and like
2 Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343 (N. Y. 1820); Winslow v.
Troy, 97 Me. 130, 53 Atl. 1008 (1902).
3 Floyd County v. Wolfe, 138 Iowa 749, 117 N. W. 32 (1908); Marvis
v. Marvis, 216 App. Div. 291, 215 N. Y. Supp. 43 (2d Dep't 1926).
4 N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 7.
5N. Y. CODE CIv. PRoC. § 1747.
6 Marvis v. Marvis, 216 App. Div. 291, 215 N. Y. Supp. 43 (2d Dep't
1926); Whitney v. Whitney, 121 Misc. 485, 201 N. Y. Supp. 227 (Sup. Ct.
1923).
7 Reed v. Reed, 195 App. Div. 531, 186 N. Y. Supp. 897 (3d Dep't 1921);
Smith v. Smith, 112 Misc. 371, 184 N. Y. Supp. 134 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
8 244 N. Y. 424, 155 N. E. 728 (1927).
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regrets." * In spite of this language, and because of the basic in-
justice in denying a sane spouse a right of action in such case, the
legislature, in the following year, enacted an amendment' 0 so that
now the action may be brought by either party.
So far we have dealt solely with the situation where one party
was insane at the time of the marriage. But what of the situation
where both parties were sane at the time of marriage, but one later
became insane? There could be no annulment under such circum-
stances, even at the instance of the insane spouse."1 The marriage
was valid when contracted. There was no lack of consent at the
time. Yet the hardship existed in such a case just as much as in
the cases previously discussed. It was for this reason that Section
7(5) of the Domestic Relations Law was originally enacted.' 2 This
9 Hoadley v. Hoadley, 244 N. Y. 424, 436, 155 N. E. 728, 732 (1927).10 Laws of N. Y. 1928, c. 83, amending N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1137.
22 Banker v. Banker, 63 N. Y. 409 (1875) ; Forman v. Forman, 24 N. Y.
Supp. 917 (Super. Ct 1893).
22 Laws of N. Y. 1928, c. 589, amended by Laws of N. Y. 1945, c. 686,
and Laws of N. Y. 1948, c. 362. The section now reads: "A marriage is
void from the time its nullity is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction
if either party thereto: ...
"5. Has been incurably insane for a period of five years or more; pro-
vided, however, that in an action to annul a marriage on such grounds,
"(a) If the marriage be annulled on the ground of the insanity of the
wife, the court, before rendering judgment, must exact security, to be ap-
proved by a judge of the court, for her suitable care and recording of the
instrument creating such security in the office of the clerk of the county in
which the action is brought and the filing of two certified copiet thereof with
the department of mental hygiene at its Albany office.
"(b) Judgment annulling a marriage on such ground shall not be rendered
until, in addition to any other proofs in the case, a thorough examination of
the alleged insane party shall have been made by three physicians who are
recognized authorities on mental disease, to be appointed by the court all of
whom shall have agreed that such party is incurably insane and shall have so
reported to the court. In such. action, the testimony of a i.hysician attache&
to a state hospital in the department of mental hygiene as to information which
he acquired in attending u patient in a professional capacity at such hospital,
shall be taken before a referee appointed by a judge of the court in which such
action is pending; provided, however, that any judge of such court at any
time in his discretion, notwithstanding such deposition, may order that a sub-
poena issue for the attendance and examination of such physician upon the
trial of the action. In such case a copy of the order shall be served together
with the subpoena.
"(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), when the person alleged to
be incurably insane is confined in a state hospital for the insane, one, and one
only, of the physicians so appointed shall be a member of the resident staff of
such hospital designated by the superintendent thereof. If the alleged incurably
insane person is not confined in a state hospital for the insane, one of the ex-
amining physicians named in pursuance to this section shall be the superin-
tendent of a state hospital for the insane.
"(d) When the plaintiff has been permitted to bring such action or prose-
cute the same as a poor person, pursuant to the'provisions of the civil practice
act, the court shall appoint three physicians who are qualified examiners as
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statute provides for a dissolution of the marriage at the instance of
the sane spouse where the other spouse has been incurably insane for
five years. Although the statute refers to such an action as an
"annulment," yet it is really in the nature of a divorce, as the disso-
lution is based on a cause accruing subsequent to the contraction of
a valid marriage.1 3 This statute has been referred to in one case as
a "drastic change" in the law.' 4 Formerly marriages were dissolved
only because there was no valid contract in the inception, or because
of wrongful conduct of one of the parties. A dissolution on the
ground of insanity is therefore in derogation of the prior law, and
should be strictly construed. 15  And because the parties to such an
action are not on an equal level, the one being insane, the legislature
and the courts in carrying out the legislative intent have carefully
outlined the procedure to be followed in such a case in order to pro-
tect the incompetent party. Therefore the courts generally require
the appointment of a special guardian "I who is given a high degree
of responsibility in guarding the rights of such a defendant. He
must ascertain the nearest relatives and advise them of the pending
action. He must avail himself of every possible opportunity to get
information, and this includes visiting the mental patient, talking to
doctors, and studying hospital records. He must also pass on the
sufficiency of the bond which is required to be posted by the plaintiff
husband for the care of his insane wife for her life.17
As a further safeguard, "At the trial the plaintiff is required to
offer the most comprehensive and convincing testimony in support
of the allegations of his complaint. In no other civil action known
to the law is so high a degree of proof required as in a case of this
character." 18 There must be such proof of incurable insanity not
only at the time of trial, but also for five years preceding. In order
defined by section nineteen of the mental hygiene law, in the employment of
the department of mental hygiene. Such qualified examiners shall make the
examination of the alleged insane party and file with the court a verified re-
port of their findings and conclusions without cost to such plaintiff. Such
report shall be received in evidence upon the trial of the action without the
personal appearance or testimony of such examiners. If the court shall deem
it necessary that the testimony of any of such examiners be taken, the court
may order the taking of such testimony by deposition only. The qualified ex-
aminers so appointed by the court may be members of the resident medical
staff of any state hospital, whether or not the alleged insane person is being
confined there." (Matter in italics added Laws of N. Y. 1948, c. 362.)
13 Stevens v. People's Bank of Hamburg, N. Y., 246 App. Div. 481, 284
N. Y. Supp. 929 (4th Dep't 1936); Kuphal v. Kuphal, 177 Misc. 255, 29
N. Y. S. 2d 868 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Ambruster v. Ambruster, 170 Misc. 387,
8 N. Y. S. 2d 821 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
14 Rostacher v. Rostacher, 172 Misc. 86, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
'5 Ibid.
16 N. Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT § 208.
17 Rostacher v. Rostacher, 172 Misc. 86, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1939).




to establish insanity, the statute requires '9 that the court designate
three physicians to examine the patient, one and only one of these
being a resident member of the medical staff of a state hospital, all
of whom must agree that the patient is incurably insane. Prior to
the amendment here under discussion, two of these physicians were
required to attend the trial and give testimony, one of these required
witnesses being the doctor from the state hospital. This subsection
has been recently amended. 20 to permit testimony of such physician
attached to a state hospital to be taken by deposition before a referee
appointed by the judge, although the judge, in his discretion, may
order that a subpoena issue for the attendance and examination of
such physician at the trial.
The revision of this section is primarily for the benefit and con-
venience of the members of the medical profession. It also benefits
the plaintiff of moderate means who does not come within the classi-
fication of a "poor person." Such "poor person" is not required to
have his medical witnesses appear in person or testify at the trial.21
Prior to the revision, however, the ordinary plaintiff had to undergo
considerable expense in some cases to bring the physician-witness
before the court. This could effect a considerable hardship on both
physician and plaintiff where the alleged insane person was confined
in an institution in a remote corner of the state, or even more so when
confined out of the state, because of the "continuing right in a husband
both to fix and shift the matrimonial domicile [of an incompetent]
and the legal principle that the domicile of a mental incompetent must
be fixed by some other properly qualified person exercising control
over such incompetent." 22
The convenience of deposition afforded to the plaintiff and physi-
cian does not mean that the legislature has relaxed in its requirement
of proof of incurable insanity for it is still within the discretion of
the judge of the court to require the physician to appear personally
at the trial. Thus, in the final analysis, whether the testimony is
personal or by deposition, the decision rests with the judge whether
or not to open the door of freedom for the sane spouse. Even though
the legislature has widened that door of freedom, a firm supervision
of the legislative intent by the judiciary will act as a safety-chain to
prevent its becoming a revolving door of exploitation of our mental
unfortunates.
JoHN H. SHEAHAN.
'ON. Y. Dom. RET.. LAW § 7(5) (b).
20 Laws of N. Y. 1948, c. 362, effective July 1, 1948.
21 N. Y. Dom. REL,. LAW § 7(5) (d). This subsection was added by Laws
of N. Y. 1945, c. 686.22 Kuphal v. Kuphal, 177 Misc. 255, 259, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 868, 873 (Sup. Ct.
1941).
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